) have garnered considerable press coverage. Other newsworthy applications of forensic DNA technology may be found in cases in which forensic DNA testing has been used to bring closure to long-unresolved cases and to obtain convictions in extended serial cases (Burns & Smith, 1999) . Both of these applications of forensic DNA technology seem to have also fueled a popular culture interest in high-tech forensics, which is evident in the American prime time television airing of a smattering of programs-such as CSI: Crime Scene Investigation and its spin-offs-aimed at capitalizing on the public's current fascination with contemporary forensic science. Even best-selling fiction authors have jumped on the forensic bandwagon and have tried their hand at popscience amateur sleuthing (Cornwell, 2002) .
In the areas of both law enforcement and prosecution and public policy formation, early discussions of the application of forensic DNA technology in the criminal justice setting-although, for the most part, rather optimistic-were still characterized by a significant degree of trepidation regarding its reliability and evidentiary value (Balding, 2000) . Such reservations were clearly articulated by Lander (1989) , who was strongly critical of the handling and interpretation of DNA profile evidence-especially with regard to the potential for contamination and making inferences about the accuracy of testing procedures (see also Krane, Allen, Sawyer, Petrov, & Hartl, 1992; Lewontin & Hartl, 1991) . Such technical and procedural issues have, however, been largely settled over time (Weir, 1995 (Weir, , 1996 . Accordingly, the current use of forensic DNA analysis is generally undisputed in terms of its ability to identify criminal offenders accurately and for the potential release of those who have been wrongfully convicted (Geisser, 2000; Weir, 2000) .
Nevertheless, the assumption of inherent usefulness-and even the creation of a national DNA database (or the Combined DNA Index System, referred to as CODIS 1 )-has outpaced the production of social scientific research regarding the degree to which the expanded access to, and application of, such technology would serve as a net social benefit. In particular, although this new technology deriving from research on the human genome enhances the opportunity for the criminal justice system to do justice in more cases of suspected wrongdoing, it also creates an added need for law enforcement agencies to review old, cold cases for potential biological evidence that should be sent to a crime laboratory for testing. As a consequence, the need arises for the calculation of trade-offs on various alternative uses of law enforcement and prosecutorial resources.
Policy makers may be interested in discussing solutions to the problem of an added burden on law enforcement and crime laboratories, but they require a more complete understanding of the key dimensions of the problem-especially because such solutions may entail a significant reallocation of public resources. At this point, therefore, the questions of evidence backlog in law enforcement agencies and of organizational capacity at crime laboratories remain unanswered. Although it is commonly believed that a substantial backlog of cases that may be amenable to the application of forensic DNA analysis does exist, no clear impression of the extent of the backlog has previously been available.
In an effort to fill this gap, the present study estimates the size of the national backlog of unsolved criminal cases in the United States that might reasonably benefit from forensic DNA analysis. Based on commentaries systematically collected from law enforcement agency executives and crime laboratory administrators, we assess the difficulties associated with the safe storage and timely processing of forensic DNA evidence. In the end, we hope to provide policy makers with a clearer picture as to the scale of the current case backlog problem and the variety of noteworthy problems associated with processing forensic DNA evidence in criminal cases at the present time. Congress recently allocated $100,000,000 in the fiscal year 2004 federal budget to address the DNA-backlog problem; the purpose of this article is to shed light on whether this figure is likely to be sufficient and to indicate the primary barriers to the effective use of forensic DNA technology so that these new resources can be used to the maximum extent possible.
Research Strategy
We address the issues of backlog and organizational capacity using data gathered from a nationally representative sample of local law enforcement agencies and the total population of both state and local crime laboratories. In doing so, this study applies several data collection methods, including extensive legal analyses of state statutes on DNA data collection standards, telephone interviews of local crime investigators and prosecutors, and a series of self-administered survey instruments sent to law enforcement executives and to crime laboratory administrators. The methodology developed for the study involves an application of Dillman's (2000) total design method to a self-administered mail survey of law enforcement agencies and forensics laboratories. The principal objectives of the study presented here are to (a) arrive at defensible estimates of the numbers of unsolved cases (homicides, rapes, and property crimes) extant in the United States that are likely to contain condemning or exculpatory DNA evidence and (b) to identify the problems facing state and local agencies regarding the proper storage and timely and accurate processing of forensic DNA evidence in criminal felony cases.
Methods

Sampling Strategies
All state and local forensic DNA processing laboratories were assessed (for the purposes of this study, the term local laboratory is defined to include those laboratories serving city, county, or regional jurisdictions.) Responses were obtained from all 50 state laboratories and all 70 local laboratories from across the country. Because of the large number of local law enforcement agencies in this country (between 15,000 and 18,000 agencies, depending on the inclusion or exclusion of special police agencies such as the U.S. Border Patrol, airport police, harbor police, park police, etc.), the 34 Criminal Justice Policy Review research design called for the development of a law enforcement agency sampling protocol. This protocol allowed for the selection of agencies from within numerous basic selection strata. Working from up-to-date national mailing lists, both sheriff offices and municipal police departments were divided into sampling strata on the basis of the number of commissioned officers employed. All police agencies with more than 100 commissioned officers (both sheriff and municipal police agencies) were included in the primary stratum. Random samples ranging from 500 to 1,000 were taken from the remaining sampling categories (unspecified size, under 25 commissioned officers, 25 to 50 commissioned officers, 50 to 100 commissioned officers) to which all tribal law enforcement agencies were added to arrive at a final mail sample list of approximately 3,400 law enforcement agencies.
A significant number of law enforcement agencies (n = 1,692), particularly the larger organizations, completed the mail questionnaire.
2 This respectable level of response provides considerable confidence in the results reported here (see the Appendix for response rates registered within each of the sampling strata). Local law enforcement agencies from every state in the United States, which serve approximately 154,467,000 citizens of the United States, responded to the survey sponsored by the National Institute of Justice. Based on the broadly representative nature of the many responding agencies and on the overall response rate, we are confident that the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the responses to the mail surveys are methodologically supportable and representative of law enforcement in the nation as a whole.
The law enforcement agencies taking part in the survey are broadly representative of the local law enforcement agency community nationally. The law enforcement agency responses are (in a geographic sense) proportionately spread across the agency size strata identified above, and they represent local police agencies from each of the 50 states. In this analysis, only tribal agencies and those of unspecified size are seriously underrepresented among participating agencies. In many instances the tribal agencies did not have access to the data sought by the assessment because the federal government (Bureau of Indian Affairs) typically handles these types of cases involving major violent crimes on Indian reservations. One troublesome issue does arise from the consideration of the level of response achieved for some types of law enforcement agencies in the study. The smaller agencies did not respond at as high a rate as did the large agencies, and those agencies of unspecified size responded at a rather low rate. This fact may systematically influence the results of our analyses and may therefore affect some of the conclusions drawn (Kalton, 1983) . In light of this limitation, particularly conservative approaches to the calculation of the national estimates of case backlogs were employed in the analyses that follow.
Analytic Strategy
Given the caution associated with the varying response rates across sampling strata discussed above and the skewed distributions of certain measures being assessed in this section (e.g., the numbers of unsolved rapes and homicides and unsolved property crimes), a statistically conservative estimation approach was adopted. The skewness Pratt et al. / Forensic DNA Backlog and Processing 35 noted in the crime measures was driven by the very large estimates received from the nation's largest law enforcement agencies. The estimates reported here were calculated in multiple ways to ensure that they are not the artifacts of a single method of statistical estimation. In particular, the following summary estimate figures were generated by a semiparametric method involving a weighted decile approach. This procedure entailed excluding the cases at the 10th and 90th percentiles in the calculation of the mean and confidence interval estimates and adding the excluded cases back into the end totals for a final backlog estimate. This statistical estimation approach was taken so that the estimates from the large law enforcement agencies would be reflected fully in the totals calculated but would not disproportionately influence the calculation of the mean estimates (e.g., see the discussions on the consequences of skewness by Blalock, 1972; Hanushek & Jackson, 1977) .
The results obtained through this procedure were cross-checked by exposure to several standard statistical diagnostic procedures. These commonly used procedures employed in the tackling of statistical estimation problems included performing log transformations on each variable of interest to correct for skewness (separate analyses for both log base 10 and e were conducted), and calculating separate estimates within each strata of agency size (under the assumption that pattern of skewness may vary according to the size of the agency, which it certainly did) with and without log transformations. In the end, using a series of difference-of-means tests, none of the results from these several diagnostic statistical procedures produced backlog estimates that differed significantly (at p < .05) from those reported here. Consequently, we are confident that the estimates arrived at and reported here are not contingent on any particular analytic strategy. 
Results and Discussion
The results of our analysis are presented and discussed here in two stages. First, we present our national estimates of the total number of unsolved rape, homicide, and property crimes with possible DNA evidence currently existing in law enforcement agency backlogs. The second stage involves a series of analyses that highlight the barriers and problems associated with the storage and processing of forensic DNA evidence cited by law enforcement agencies and by state and local crime laboratories across the country. Local law enforcement agencies were also asked how many murder and rape cases contained possible biological evidence that had not been sent to a forensic laboratory for testing. These findings, also displayed in Table 1 , show that a substantial portion of the adjusted totals for rape (169,229) and homicide (51,774) cases has not been sent to a forensic laboratory for testing. Indeed, using the adjusted totals, an extrapolated total of 221,003 cases may contain biological evidence that has not been sent to a forensic laboratory for DNA testing.
Unsolved Rapes and Homicides
Additionally, state and local laboratories reported 57,349 backlogged DNA rape and homicide cases (although several laboratories were unable to provide a distinction between case types in their backlog, so this figure includes a number of property crime cases). This number, combined with the adjusted totals for DNA cases at local law enforcement agencies, brings the sum adjusted total of estimated rape and murder cases still requiring DNA review to as many as 278,352.
Unsolved Property Offenses
The majority of law enforcement agencies report that forensic DNA evidence is not routinely collected from property crime scenes, and similarly, a majority of local and state crime laboratories report that law enforcement does not perform routine collection of DNA from property crimes. The common assumption (made by nearly half of the law enforcement agencies participating in the survey) is that their local or state crime laboratory does not accept DNA evidence from property crimes for unnamed suspects. However, additional analyses indicate that 75% of reporting local laboratories and 88% of state laboratories report that they do accept and process unnamed suspect property crime evidence (see Lovrich et al., 2004) .
These findings point to a shortcoming in the understanding on the part of law enforcement of the policies of forensic laboratories that serve them. These findings also signal an inconsistency between local law enforcement's understanding of what forensic analysis is being done (versus what the actual services of their crime laboratories are) in practice. Even so, it is equally plausible that these findings signal a discrepancy between the policies and practices of the state and local crime laboratories where, despite the possible existence of a written policy regarding the processing of forensic DNA evidence for property cases, the practical constraints facing such agencies results in a de facto prohibition against doing so.
Despite this apparent information gap between local law enforcement agencies' perceptions and crime laboratory policies, the information collected in the law enforcement survey process still allows for the estimation of the total number of property crimes that may contain biological evidence across the nation. Accordingly, using the adjusted totals reported in Table 1 , there is an extrapolated total of as many as 264,371 property offenses with possible biological evidence in the United States. Thus, on adding the adjusted numbers of homicides, rapes, property crimes and other cases with possible DNA evidence from law enforcement agencies and state and local crime laboratories, there are currently as many as 542,723 unsolved homicide, rape, and property offense cases for possible DNA analysis known to law enforcement agencies and crime laboratories currently extant in the United States.
Storage Issues for Forensic DNA Evidence
Of those cases where biological crime scene evidence is not sent to a crime laboratory for testing or where evidence is returned to the local agency if current technology cannot produce the necessary results, a central concern for law enforcement agencies (especially the large agencies) is the availability of appropriate storage space for unanalyzed evidence. Pressures on evidence storage space can result in degradable biological evidence being maintained under improper conditions-or worse yet, being discarded or not collected at all for a lack of space to store it safely. Accordingly, Table 2 summarizes these storage issues for local law enforcement agencies. Most law enforcement agencies (79.0%) indicate that unanalyzed evidence is typically held in a centralized storage area. A majority (61.0%) of these agencies indicated that they currently have insufficient storage capacity for evidence retention needs relating to DNA evidence. It is also important to note that 75.7% of the large law enforcement agencies indicated that gaining additional space for the effective preservation of evidence was either of critical or highly critical 4 importance (with 70.3% of all responding agencies responding similarly).
It is also worth noting that more than a fifth (22.0%) of all responding law enforcement agencies reported that some of their unanalyzed evidence is stored at the crime laboratory rather than in their own agency's evidence repositories. Among police agencies reporting that biological evidence is stored at the crime laboratory, nearly 40% were from the largest jurisdictions in the sample. Considering that larger jurisdictions typically have higher crime rates and therefore a higher demand for forensic DNA analysis, this finding suggests that many crime laboratories may also be facing similar strains on evidence storage capacity. As such, a number of forensic laborato- ries are likely to find they are responsible for not only storing evidence from their own cases-both unanalyzed backlog cases and analyzed evidence-but also for storing evidence from cases from the law enforce-ment jurisdictions they serve.
Barriers to Case Processing: Law Enforcement Agencies
In addition to these storage issues, part of what may be driving these backlog numbers at local law enforcement agencies are the specific reasons behind why forensic DNA evidence from unsolved homicides and unsolved rapes have not been sent to a crime laboratory for testing. Table 3 contains the percentages for the most common explanations provided by law enforcement agencies as to why such evidence has not been sent to a crime laboratory.
The primary reason for the failure to submit forensic DNA for analysis is that a suspect has not yet been identified (31.4% of all responding agencies). This finding is a strong indication that forensic DNA testing is not considered to be an investigatory tool by a significant portion of law enforcement agencies. Two other categories of responses to this question are of a similar nature, and they warrant consideration as part of this general discussion. The responses "A suspect has been identified but not yet charged" and "Analysis not requested by prosecutors" again show the inclination toward using DNA analysis as a tool for the prosecution but not necessarily as an aid to identifying a crime suspect. When all three of these categories are combined, an estimated 50.8% of respondents indicated that forensic DNA was not considered to be a primary tool for law enforcement criminal investigations.
Of even further concern, our results indicate that in many instances, law enforcement officials were unaware of the fact that a national DNA database (CODIS) has Another theme in the law enforcement agency responses regarding the failure to submit biological evidence for testing relates to cost and resource considerations. Individually, few agencies reported that evidence is not sent to crime laboratories because of a lack of funding for DNA analysis (9.4%), the inability of crime laboratories to produce timely results (10.4%), or because crime laboratories are not processing requests for DNA (3.8%). Each of these reasons may, however, be considered in the overall context of fiscal limitations. Timely results require the existence of adequate capacity on the part of crime laboratories to handle demand, yet such capacity is oftentimes limited by resources. Crime laboratories that are not processing requests for DNA testing may be doing so primarily as a fallback means of caseload management, occasioned by limited staff capacity and by operational resources. Taken together, therefore, an estimated 23.6% of law enforcement agencies do not submit DNA cases for reasons 40 Criminal Justice Policy Review relating to funding considerations. This grouping represents the second most frequently indicated reason for not submitting evidence for DNA testing. In fact, the issue of lengthy delays in DNA analysis time was identified as a major concern by a significant number of law enforcement respondents who included comments with their completed surveys. The following comments regarding crime laboratory evidence-processing delays also reinforce the results discussed previously regarding the fact that law enforcement agencies tend to view DNA as a tool for prosecutors but not for detectives.
[The] state laboratory has more than a 4-year wait for processing DNA from property crimes.
Therefore, we do not submit it unless the crime is of major significance. DNA cases sent to laboratory with no suspect having been arrested are 1 to 2 year wait, even if a suspect is named and in [a] DNA database.
[The] state police laboratory system is inadequate for producing timely results-average waiting period is 1 1/2 to 2 years. DNA evidence is beginning to have a significant impact on our investigations . . . . However, the process of DNA evidence is expensive and creates a financial burden for the local police and the state laboratories. If funding was not an issue, DNA would prove to be one of the most valuable tools in solving cases.
Given these comments, it is clear that the delay in processing time and associated fiscal considerations are issues that law enforcement agencies have identified as noteworthy obstacles to their use of DNA evidence. These issues also bring to the fore a larger question relating to evidence collection. Specifically, if law enforcement officers do not see DNA as a primary part of their investigation, what effect do these factors have on the likelihood that investigators will identify, collect, and submit forensic DNA evidence? There is also the question of how much potentially valuable DNA evidence is simply not collected by law enforcement officials who have little hope that forensic analysis will be conducted in a timely manner. Indeed, certain comments from law enforcement agencies on this issue seem to indicate that this may be a bigger problem than anticipated. For example, the comments from three responding law enforcement agencies clearly suggest the scale of the problem in question: We provided all property detectives with DNA evidence training 2 months ago with the request to make testing routine. This is in progress. However, it is a cultural change that is difficult.
explore the reasons behind this backlog, an item was included in the local laboratory survey concerning the various obstacles facing local crime laboratories in securing DNA evidence from either unsolved rapes or unsolved homicides in queue at the laboratory. The findings reported in Table 4 indicate that funding and backlog considerations both play an important role in processing DNA evidence from unsolved homicide and rape cases. 5 In particular, local laboratories noted the importance of at least three reasons why DNA evidence from these types of cases may not be processed: A suspect has not yet been identified (noted as important by 37.0% of local laboratory respondents), a guilty plea is anticipated (30.4%), or the DNA analysis may not be requested by the prosecution (34.8%). Other important factors included the situation in which the participant has yet to be charged (26.1%) and cases where the agency may be uncertain as to how the DNA analysis may help close the case (28.3%).
Cost or Funding Issues
Many of the major obstacles associated with DNA analysis concern the cost or funding issues involved, and the local and state crime laboratories were assessed on a number of these issues. In addition to the items presented in Table 4 , local and state crime laboratory administrators were asked to indicate from what sources the bulk of their funding is derived. Table 5 shows that the majority of funding for the local crime laboratories comes from local sources. Similarly, state crime laboratories receive most of their funding from state sources. Conversely, most state laboratories (91.6%) receive little to no funding from local sources, and 88.9% of local laboratories report a similarly low level of assistance from the state.
What this table also reveals is that federal funding does not comprise a significant portion of the overall forensic DNA processing budgets of state and local crime labo- ratories. Indeed, only 20.5% of state laboratories receive half or more of their funding from federal sources-a figure that drops to a mere 4.5% for local laboratories. When considering that many of the local laboratories handle extremely high volumes of forensic DNA cases, this difference in reliance on federal funding is startling.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In the absence of any informational alternative to the major television networks' crime-drama portrayals of case processing, we might well assume that forensic DNA evidence is easy to collect and that no capacity for evidence storage on the part of law enforcement agencies is necessary because crime laboratories have a turnaround time of around 5 to 10 minutes for DNA samples. Although we probably did not need the statistical analyses presented here to reveal how unrealistic such popular depictions are, it is still quite striking too see just how severe these issues of casework backlog and organizational capacity are nationwide.
In the relatively brief amount of time that forensic DNA has been available to the criminal justice system, its impact has already proven remarkable-from the conviction of rapists and murderers to the exoneration of wrongly convicted inmates on death row. Even so, the effectiveness of forensic DNA has resulted in a tremendous demand for additional testing that has not been met by a corresponding increase in available supply. The purpose of this study was to estimate the potential number of DNA cases sitting in law enforcement evidence rooms, storage areas, and crime laboratories throughout the country. Our second objective was to uncover the reasons for why so many cases with unanalyzed DNA evidence can be found at both law enforcement agencies and crime laboratories. In the process of doing so, the work presented here leads to four major conclusions. First, the backlog of unsolved rapes and homicides in the United States is massive. When unsolved property offenses with possible biological evidence are added into the equation, there are an estimated 700,000 of these unsolved cases nationally. Furthermore, of the more than 400,000 unsolved rapes and homicides nationally, law enforcement agencies reported that roughly half of such cases are likely to contain biological evidence for DNA testing. Thus, when including the extant unsolved property offenses with biological evidence, there may be a national total of 553,821 unsolved rapes, homicides, and property offenses that may be amenable to DNA testing.
Second, a significant proportion of law enforcement agencies continue to misunderstand the potential benefits of forensic DNA testing. As reported by nearly one fourth of all law enforcement agencies, one of the primary reasons for not sending DNA evidence to a crime laboratory for testing is the lack of a suspect. The problem, however, is that this is exactly the kind of situation where the existing offender DNA database (CODIS) is most useful. It is clear that most law enforcement agencies still consider the use of forensic DNA evidence as, at best, supplementary to more traditional police investigative work (see the discussions by Brandl & Frank, 1994; Gaines & Kappeler, 2002; Greenwood, Chaiken, & Petersilia, 1977; Osterburg & Ward, 1997) .
It is possible that changes in organizational policy and training practices may help law enforcement agencies become more up to speed regarding the potential advantages of forensic DNA analysis. Even so, until additional resources become available for such changes, it is unlikely that law enforcement's still limited understanding of the use of forensic DNA analysis will change any time soon. Relatedly, our third conclusion is that both state and local crime laboratories are overworked, understaffed, and insufficiently funded. These agencies simply do not have the capacity to handle their current caseloads-let alone their anticipated backlogs for the near future-in a timely manner.
Our final conclusion is that the role of the federal government in funding forensic DNA analysis has been, up to this point, important but rather minimal. Indeed, the majority of funding for local crime laboratories is derived from local sources, and the majority of funding for state crime laboratories comes from state sources. Only one in five state-crime laboratories, and fewer than 1 in 20 local-crime laboratories, report that the majority of their funding comes from federal sources. This funding scheme is not necessarily inconsistent with other areas of criminal justice administration, where the bulk of resources for policing, courts, and corrections agencies come from state and local governments (see, Austin & Irwin, 2001; Baum, 1996; Friedman, 1993; Gest, 2001; Mauer, 1999; Walker, 1999) . Nevertheless, the major policy implication emanating from this study is that there is clearly a greater potential role for the federal government to play in assisting with the current backlog problem. There is also a concomitant need for state and local governments to reevaluate their degree of investment in their forensic crime laboratories given that demand for services has far outstripped the availability of access to forensic DNA analysis during the past several years.
